For many years, the Center for Liberal Modernity has partnered with East Europe Foundation to implement a project in Ukraine aimed at strengthening interparliamentary dialogue and supporting European integration. Over the course of the program, the partners have organized hundreds of bilateral and multilateral meetings and dozens of international study visits. These activities have included expert discussions, thematic conferences, roundtables, and working trips that have deepened mutual understanding and cooperation.
Do you remember how your cooperation with Ukraine began?
My husband — who was then president of the Heinrich Böll Foundation — and me, being member of parliament both had contacts to Kyjiv long before the events of 2014. The partnership began from both sides: the Böll Foundation, which closely cooperates with civil society organizations, and our side — the political wing within parliament.
What I remember most vividly is the Maidan. I was there very often during the Revolution of Dignity — through those terrible nights — thanks to colleagues from the Böll Foundation, who had an office in Kyiv. That’s how our closer cooperation with Ukraine began.
Later, in 2017, we founded the Zentrum Liberale Moderne. It was before the full-scale invasion, but it was already clear that the “Minsk agreements” weren’t working. We created this analytical center, held seminars on the EU free trade area, and began looking for partners. At that time, there was a widespread expectation that Ukraine was on a fast track toward EU membership.
The topic of the free trade area was in great demand and technically quite complex, especially for new members of parliament who entered the Verkhovna Rada after the elections. Most of them were well educated but lacked parliamentary experience. I could understand that — as someone who joined the Green Party in its early days, when we first entered parliament in 1983. We were also a group of newcomers learning how everything worked.
So our idea was to share our experience with all Ukrainian MPs, especially the new ones, as they advanced on their path toward the EU.
What key transformations has Ukraine undergone on this path to the EU? What are the most significant changes you have seen in Ukrainian society?
Perhaps “transformation” isn’t quite the word I’d start with. I would rather say that Ukraine has clearly set its course westward — and it was the people who showed that by demanding fair and free elections.
I remember being in Ukraine during the first presidential elections after the Maidan — I believe I was there as an observer. I had never seen so many people voting with such passion. The lines outside schools and polling stations were enormous. It was deeply moving.
At that moment, many people probably didn’t realize that returning to the democratic path would bring new hardships, and that progress would be much slower than expected.
But if we do speak about transformation, one moment made a strong impression on me. We were in Kharkiv. Even then, many civilians were helping those at the front. I remember stopping at a restaurant where we first met Serhiy Zhadan. The restaurant was run by a woman whose husband delivered food to soldiers at the front — meals they prepared together.
Later, we rented a bus and continued further east. On the road, two police officers stopped us, claiming we had exceeded the speed limit (we hadn’t) and demanded a fine. Our driver — the woman’s husband — took out his phone and began filming the officers: “You want money? Then let’s talk. But I think those days are over.”
That wasn’t about signing an agreement with Brussels. It was about everyday life — people who had stopped being afraid. And that was crucial. The entire system of corruption is built on fear. That moment was incredibly meaningful. It showed that the desire for change and freedom came from within society itself.
What can both sides — Ukraine and Europe — do to advance European transformation and help Ukraine finally join the EU, even if the road is still long?
I think those of us who are true friends of Ukraine are deeply frustrated — not with you, but with how ineffective the EU has become. Some member states behave almost like Russian proxies and can block progress from within.
Of course, we all understand that opening the first chapter of accession talks would be an incredibly important signal — one that Ukraine urgently needs right now to feel that all this suffering hasn’t been in vain. But instead, we see hesitation — not only in the military sphere but also politically and institutionally.
You have devoted much of your work to building dialogue — creating bridges between politicians, countries, and organizations. How can we preserve the value of understanding and cooperation for a shared goal in a world increasingly poisoned by populism, propaganda, and post-truth?
If we look at Ukraine and the United States — or more broadly, the West — we can see something striking. The country that was once seen as a guarantor of freedom and democracy is now moving down a path where political communication is increasingly filled with hatred. We need to communicate. We need to talk. In democracies communication is crucial. There is no other way to achieve understanding.
How do you keep hope alive? How do you continue to believe that things can still get better?
No one knows whether Ukraine — or any of us — will ultimately succeed. That has not yet been decided. And sometimes, when there is so much bad news and so many setbacks, it’s hard to stay optimistic. So I try to ask the question differently: what’s the alternative?
Because it’s not just about whether Ukraine can become part of the so-called Western world, whatever that may mean. We all understand: if Ukraine is handed over to Putin, his aggression won’t stop there.
In our societies, we see how both the far right and the far left exploit this issue in very simplistic ways. It’s easy to campaign on slogans like: “Pensions aren’t rising, food is more expensive, and the government is still sending money to Ukraine? Are you out of your mind?” It’s a simple but deeply flawed logic.
That’s the challenge for democracies: elections are held every four years, budgets must pass through parliament, and today’s opposition can become tomorrow’s majority. So if we keep repeating, “This is about helping Ukraine,” — that won’t be enough. Ukraine is fighting the fight for our freedom. We are not helping Ukraine – they are helping us. Look at Sweden, Finland and the Baltic States. They understood that Putin will not stop at Ukraine if the West does not stop him successfully. He will head for more. Maybe not in two years, maybe in five — but he will not stop.
We really must be concerned about how Russian propaganda and hybrid operations are strengthening pro-Russian forces — both right-wing and left-wing — within our own countries.
In Ukraine, as a society and as citizens, we understand well what needs to be done at home: modernizing institutions, building transparency, overcoming corruption. These remain huge challenges. But Europe also needs modernization — and many Western intellectuals are saying this openly. Can Ukraine somehow help Europe in this process?
Yes, it can — if we stop burying our heads in the sand.
I would tell my colleagues in the West: if you think there is no alternative, then realize that the only truly battle-ready army in Europe today is the Ukrainian one. Our own armies are not prepared to fight. We lack industrial capacity, manufacturing facilities, production lines. We buy our military equipment from the U.S. — and we don’t even know how long that will last. One day, the US government might simply say: “We need it ourselves now.”
It’s not only that Trump could pressure Ukraine — he can pressure the entire EU. So yes, we are in a state of deep uncertainty. And if, in this situation, Ukrainians are forced into a “negotiated outcome” — say, a divided country — it would be a catastrophe.
If we were truly rational — genuinely rational — we would have to fear two developments in case of a Russian victory. The fact that Russia would gain he hands over the Ukrainian army. It is the only modern and experienced one within Europe. And there would be millions of Ukrainian refugees who do not want to live under Russian occupation.
As you said, much comes down to fear. But fear can be overcome through new connections.
Organizations like East Europe Foundation and Zentrum Liberale Moderne — how do you see the role of such partnerships in driving change? Is it mainly about joining forces to get the work done, or do these partnerships serve an even greater purpose?
Ultimately, it’s about societies getting to know one another. That’s crucial.
I was born in 1952, so I still remember the prejudices Nazi Germany spread about Ukrainians during World War II. the Nazis exterminated the Jewish population and they forced Ukrainians into slave labor, denying them rights, equality, respect, and dignity.
Not only the SS but also part of the Wehrmacht committed horrific war crimes in Ukraine. But many of them came home and went on to have respectable careers. In my home region of Bremen, there were police battalions linked to the SS. One of their leaders even became the head of Bremen’s criminal police for 20 years.
So many of those prejudices persisted. When, in 1998, visa liberalization for Ukrainians was discussed, the opposition commented in a very ugly way. Now there would be hundreds of Ukrainian prostitutes and car thieves entering Germany. I have always felt it was essential to counter those stereotypes.
It was — and still is — important to show how modern and dynamic Ukrainian society truly is. For example, in Dnipro, I once met a young Ukrainian chef cook who had returned from New York to open his own restaurant. I never had such a super meal like in this place. In Odesa, we organized concerts with Bremen’s largest choir and Odessa`s philharmonic orchestra — and later, this Ukrainian orchestra came to Bremen and the choir and the orchestra performed in Bremen.
Simple encounters between people — getting to know one another — are decisive. Civil society organizations and analytical centers like East Europe Foundation and Zentrum Liberale Moderne can then work on broader issues, but it all starts with people talking to each other.
What three key values, in your view, unite people from Germany and Ukraine?
I’d love to say freedom, but I hesitate — because I don’t think people in Germany fully appreciate its value.
In Germany, the strongest aspiration seems to be security. Of course, Ukrainians also want security, but in a completely different sense. In Germany, it’s mostly about social security — protection from poverty, unemployment, or economic instability. So security exists in both societies, but it means very different things.
The longing for freedom I think is stronger in Ukraine than in Germany, because Ukrainians must fight for it — whereas in Germany, we’ve taken it for granted for far too long.
And the third value is inclusion. Inclusion is again a challenge in Germany when it comes to Jewish people. There is a gap between political elites who publicly condemn antisemitism and the reality — where Jewish children often attend schools behind high fences, with police cars parked outside synagogues. I have never seen such a need in Ukraine. Your sense of inclusion seems stronger, at least regarding the Jewish population.
So, considering the enormous challenges Ukraine has faced over the years, Ukrainians are often more aware of these values than we are. In Germany, we’ve taken them for granted for too long — and only now are we beginning to wake up. I just hope we wake up in time.
This interview is part of the book “Friday Letter.” You can read it in Ukrainian at the link.